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BERMAS, GOFFMAN, AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE· 
James J. Chriss 
University of Pennsylvania 
In his Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas (1984, 1987) argues that 
because Goffman's dramaturgy emphasizes the goal-oriented or strategic 
nature of actors' self-presentations, it fails to establish the conditions for 
noncoerced or reasoned communication. After reviewing Habermas's nega-
tive reading of Goffman, I assess both Habermas's and Goffman's theories 
in the context of professional practice and organizational behavior. 1 suggest 
that certain programs in the social psychology of organizations, such as 
Argyris and Schon's (1974) action research, share Habermas's one-sided 
view of Goffman 's actor as an opportunistic, insincere manipulator. This mis-
reading of Goffman results from a fundamental confusion over the ontology 
and epistemology of "impression management." I conclude that if Haber-
mas's theory of communicative action is to advance further, that is, if it is 
ever to adequately link with the empirical social world, it must come to more 
concrete terms with the nature of the presented self. 
Over the past two decades researchers in the social sciences and humanities 
have been taking the "linguistic turn," mean-
ing that they are turning their attention to is-
sues of the self and to theories of communi-
cative conduct or practice. Discussions of the 
processes or theories of the self are incom-
plete, however, if they are not formulated or 
understood within a broader analytical 
framework. Goffman's (e.g., 1959, 1971, 
1974) dramaturgical theory of action, al-
though providing important perceptions and 
descriptions of the vagaries of face-to-face 
behavior, does not on its own offer much of 
• Direct correspondence to James J. Chriss, De-
partment of Sociology, 3718 Locust Walk, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104-
6299. A much abridged version of this paper was 
presented on August 9 at the 1994 annual meet-
ing of the American Sociological Association in 
Los Angeles, CA. I thank Hugh Willmott, David 
Sciulli, John Forester, and Ivar Berg for provid-
ing helpful comments on several earlier drafts. I 
also thank the ASR reviewers for their comments. 
Much of this paper is drawn from Chapter 9 of 
my Ph.D. dissertation (Chriss 1994a). For an 
early cursory statement on the Habermas-
Goffman problem, see Chriss (1992). [The re-
viewers acknowledged by the author are Chris 
Argyris and Ben Agger. -ED.] 
a sense of how these microprocesses are 
linked to larger social structures. 
On the other hand, Talcott Parsons's (1951, 
1978) architectonic social systems schema 
provides a blueprint, a mapping, or a grid for 
the understanding, or at least the conceptual-
ization of, whole social systems. Parsons at-
tempted to reduce the massive complexity of 
social systems to a few crucial elements or 
processes. This analytical gambit amounted 
to delineating four functional requisites of 
social systems: adaptation, goal-attainment, 
integration, and latent pattern-maintenance 
(AGIL). Then he argued, by sheer force of 
reason (Parsons's notion of "analytical real-
ism"), that there exists parallel functional 
processes at all other levels of the social sys-
tem. 1 
I For example, Parsons argued that the process 
of allocating roles in society was analogous to the 
internalization, through socialization, of cultural 
norms and values in the individual. As Parsons 
(1951) states, "The allocation of personnel be-
tween roles in the social system and the social-
ization processes of the individual are clearly the 
same processes viewed in different perspectives" 
(p. 207). Both processes, then, have similar func-
tional significances at their respective levels of 
generality or specificity, namely that of integra-
tion. 
Although Parsons attempted to explain so-
cial microprocesses through his AGIL 
schema, a majority of researchers have not 
employed his blueprint in their analyses. 
Parsons's schema is considered by many to 
be bombastic, overly abstract, and not par-
ticularly amenable to empirical testing (but 
see Lidz 1986). The sense that Parsons's 
schema is detached from reality-from the 
empirical social world-led to an avalanche 
of criticisms beginning in the 1950s and ex-
tending until his death in 1979 and even be-
yond (Dahrendorf 1958; Gouldner 1970; 
Mills 1959; Wrong 1961). 
Much of this criticism of Parsons's pro-
gram was, of course, concentrated in the aca-
demic left, or "radical sociology," and espe-
cially in Marxist or neo-Marxist thought. A 
few observers have suggested, for example, 
that Parsons's (1937) "voluntaristic theory of 
action" is notable in that it includes almost 
no discussion of the works of Marx (Agger 
1992; Gouldner 1970). Parsons's program 
thus offered, at least in the minds of some 
left-leaning critics, a handy alternative to the 
Hegelian Marxism prevalent in Europe since 
the 1920s (Agger 1992:57). 
In sociology, the most successful wing of 
Marxist thought and research has been 
Frankfurt School critical theory (Kincheloe 
and McLaren 1994). Horkheimer, Adorno, 
and Marcuse are some of the thinkers who 
led the way toward establishing critical 
theory and extending its influence in sociol-
ogy, largely through the successes of a num-
ber of applied research programs (such as 
Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and 
Sanford's [1950] study of the authoritarian 
personality). In extending and updating 
Marx's legacy, the goal of Frankfurt School 
thinkers was to identify, uncover, and hope-
fully ameliorate oppressive social structures 
or circumstances. Whereas Marx had con-
centrated primarily on the objective features 
of oppression, such as those connected with 
political power and economics, the new criti-
cal theory called for a return to philosophy, 
and even to psychoanalysis, to thoroughly 
diagnose the pathologies of modern culture. 
This emphasis of critical theory continued 
until the early 1970s, when a new version of 
critical theory-call it neo-critical theory-
emerged, largely through the efforts of 
Habermas. Habermas's (1971, 1975) pro-
gram carried forward some elements of the 
Horkheimerl Adorno version of critical 
theory. For example, he retained their criti-
cal view of positivism and their goal of es-
tablishing a new theory of knowledge, which 
would, in dialectic fashion, take into account 
the social, historical, and cultural contexts 
within which that knowledge is formulated 
and accepted (i.e., the sociology of knowl-
edge; see Dahl 1995). 
But departing from the original Frankfurt 
School tradition, which was largely skeptical 
of the ability of established science to con-
tribute to the good life, Habermas aimed to 
rescue science and the Enlightenment-in-
spired force of reason through a search for 
the foundations of knowledge (Bottomore 
1984). Habermas argued that if we are in-
deed interested in identifying and eradicat-
ing oppressive social structures, we must es-
tablish a foundation or basis upon which we 
can say, with some degree of certainty, what 
is or is not a liberative or oppressive social 
structure. This understanding of social struc-
ture can be forged only if critical theorists 
turn their attention back to conceptualizing 
entire social systems, focusing once again on 
certain crucial elements heretofore neglected 
in the social science literature. 
This attention to systems theory led 
Habermas inexorably to an analysis of the 
works of Parsons. Habermas (1987) states, 
for example, that "no theory of society can 
be taken seriously today if it does not at least 
situate itself with respect to Parsons" (p. 
199). This is not to say, of course, that 
Habermas was wholly enamored of Parsons's 
theory. Habermas argues that Parsons's work 
displays a deep internal tension between the 
idealist tradition of social action and the 
positivist tradition of social systems. In es-
sence, Parsons's theory never successfully 
coupled "system" to "Iifeworld" (but see 
Munch 1993).2 This is because Parsons was 
2 Habermas (I984:82) argues that, for analyti-
cal reasons, we need to distinguish between 
"world" and "lifeworld," especially with regard 
to discussing the "rationalization of the 
lifeworld." As human beings we rely, often in 
taken-for-granted fashion, on a cultural stock of 
knowledge which, because it is already 
intersubjectively shared, both forms the back-
ground for communicative action and provides 
the foundation for our routine social doings. The 
generally inattentive to talk-to speech 
theory or to linguistic analysis, more gener-
ally. Parsons chose instead to attend to broad 
conceptions of culture, as in the culture, per-
sonality, social system triad, and this focus 
kept his theory of social action suspended 
within the system or functionalist side of the 
analytical divide. 
On the other hand, according to Habermas, 
Goffman's dramaturgical theory, although 
giving attention to social action or lifeworld 
processes, is suspended in the idealist tradi-
tion, and therefore it was never in a position 
to link adequately to systems theory. Goff-
man's mistake was that he never understood, 
perhaps never realized, that talk itself could 
contain the potential for a universal founda-
tion for critical theory that could traverse the 
lifeworid-systems divide. This foundation is, 
as Habermas argues, the universal validity 
claims inherent in all speech (to be discussed 
more thoroughly below).3 
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION IN 
ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT 
Goffman's work stands on its own as a rep-
resentation of the lifeworld processes of so-
cial interaction and face-to-face behavior. If 
we are ever to reconcile Parsons's systems 
theory with Goffman's work on the micro-
processes of communication, it seems that 
Habermas's theory of communicative action 
may serve well, as it has assimilated crucial 
aspects of Parsons's schema. 
"lifeworld" is an unthematized realm that, suf-
fused as it is with shared cultural knowledge, al-
lows us to refer thematically to something that 
actually exists in the objective world. For an ex-
tended critique of Habermas's formulation of 
Iifeworld, see Rosenthal (1992). 
3 Habermas's theory of communicative action 
can be thought of as a meso theory providing 
links from the macro or systems analytical realm 
to the micro or lifeworld analytical realm. House, 
Rousseau, and Thomas-Hunt's (1995) meso 
theory of organizational behavior, although not 
drawing from Habermas per se, nevertheless 
shares some affinities with Habermas's program, 
such as their criticism of prevailing general psy-
chological theories in the field of organizational 
behavior (OB), which tend to be context-free and 
rarely take into account macro or structural vari-
ables. 
Any further discussions of Goffman, Par-
sons, Habermas, and their interrelation at this 
high level of theoretical abstraction runs the 
risk of disintegrating into confusion, into 
something even less than a patchwork of 
ideas. Thus, I move now toward a concrete 
area of concern to facilitate this discussion 
of communicative action: professional prac-
tices, such as planning, consulting, and 
evaluation. 
I choose the substantive area of profes-
sional practice because I have worked as a 
consultant (mainly in business and education) 
and evaluator (in program planning and 
evaluation with philanthropic organizations), 
and of course I did much of this work through 
observing talk in formal (business or organi-
zational) settings. For example, consultants, 
planners, or evaluators may be hired by a 
business to observe the nature of interactions 
taking place between personnel across vari-
ous organizational hierarchies (Stein 1994). 
Organizations hiring consultants to do 
such work are concerned, of course, with the 
bottom line-improving organizational com-
munication, performance, or perhaps even 
morale.4 Sociologists familiar with Haber-
mas's or Goffman's works may well recog-
nize this particular organizational problem as 
one of "systematically distorted communica-
tion" (Habermas 1987). The goal of the con-
sultant in such a case is to recommend ac-
tions for improving the organization's com-
4 With respect to morale, an organization may 
hire a consultant if there is a widespread organi-
zational perception that employee morale is low 
or that managers are not effective in motivating 
in their employees a sense of organizational 
pride, loyalty, or teamwork. The literature on 
problems and issues of this sort falls somewhat 
outside the bounds of sociology per se, residing 
instead in literature on organizations and espe-
cially management. The practice of compelling 
employees to demonstrate loyalty to a particular 
set of organizational values has received a scath-
ing critique from Willmott (1993), who states: 
Especially in cases where insecure, fashion-con-
scious management strives to 'modernize' its 
practices, aided and abetted by consultants who 
prey upon managers' vulnerability, a paradoxical 
consequence of culture-strengthening pro-
grammes is a further degradation and distortion 
of communication as employees instrumentally 
adapt their behaviour to conform with the relevant 
corporate code. (P. 536) 
municative practices (Felts 1992; Hakel 
1994). 
A few professional planning consultants, 
such as Forester (1989, 1992) and Schroyer 
(1973), have made explicit connections be-
tween their day-to-day consulting work and 
Habermas's theory of communicative action. 
Other scholars, such as Sciulli (1992a) and 
Frankford (1994), are actively working on 
programs that attempt to implement or assess 
Habermas's ideas within the context of pro-
fessional or business practices. For the most 
part, however, the theory of communicative 
action remains distant from practice. Frank-
ford (1994) and others have suggested that 
although critical theory's major goal has al-
ways been to link theory to practice, attempts 
such as Habermas's to facilitate such links 
have not been successful. Just as with 
Parsons's AGIL schema, Habermas has faced 
the difficulty of making his abstract theory 
relevant to the empirical social world. 
The guiding idea of my paper is that Goff-
man's observations on face-to-face interac-
tion, and especially his taxonomy of verbal 
presentations of self, may be just the sort of 
empirically-grounded research to provide 
links from theory to practice. I return in the 
next section to the case of business consult-
ing, specifically Argyris and Schon's (1974) 
program of "action research." I illustrate that 
Habermas's theory of communicative action 
is relevant even in those cases where the 
practitioners themselves may be unaware of 
such theory-practice links.5 Thus, I illustrate 
5 Until 1985, Argyris and his associates 
(Argyris, Putnam, and Smith 1985) made no ex-
plicit mention of the relevance of Habermas and 
critical theory to their own work, such as in the 
following quote: 
Action science is not alone in advocating that 
communities of inquiry be enacted in communi-
ties of practice. This formulation also seems ap-
propriate to critical theory as articulated by theo-
rists of the Frankfurt School. Habermas speaks of 
creating conditions that approximate the 'ideal 
speech situation,' which would allow human be-
ings to come to a rational consensus about how to 
conduct their affairs. To our knowledge. however. 
Habermas has not devoted his energies to creat-
ing such conditions in the real world. (P. 35; ital-
ics added) 
For an interesting discussion that compares and 
contrasts Habermas's critical theory with action 
research, see Ledoux (1981). 
the potential applicability of Habermas's 
theory within business and professional set-
tings where consultants are paid to observe 
organizational actors' social and verbal inter-
action. 
I address a final issue, however, before 
continuing. One could very well argue that 
my attempt to analyze Habermas, Goffman, 
and issues of communicative action within 
the context of organizations is fatally flawed 
because, by their very nature, formal organi-
zations and other administrative entities are 
based, not on communicative rationality, but 
on purposive and instrumental rationality. 
Cooke (1994), for example, notes that "the 
administrative system does indeed represent 
a mechanism of action coordination external 
to the lifeworld" (p. 20). 
Habermas (1987) admits that even within 
formal organizations a number of routine in-
teractions between organizational members 
are connected via the mechanism of mutual 
understanding-that is, on some crucial lev-
els communicative action is assured or at 
least made possible between these organiza-
tional actors. As Habermas (1987) continues, 
Members of organizations act communicatively 
only with reservation. They know they can 
have recourse to formal regulations, not only 
in exceptional but in routine cases; there is no 
necessity for achieving consensus by commu-
nicative means .... innerorganizational rela-
tions constituted via membership do not re-
place communicative action, but they do 
disempower its validity basis so as to provide 
the legitimate possibility of redefining at will 
spheres of action oriented to mutual under-
standing into action situations stripped of 
Iifeworld contexts and no longer directed to 
achieving consensus. (Pp. 310-11) 
Although I am sympathetic to criticisms 
that, following Cooke (1994) and Habermas 
(1984, 1987), point out the instrumental, pos-
sibly even coercive nature of organizations, I 
argue that there are equally pernicious im-
pediments to engaging in noncoerced or rea-
soned communicative interaction within the 
boundaries of the lifeworld itself. Granted, 
actors may very well be ethically neutralized 
by the formal-legal constitution of action 
systems typical of organizations-this 
amounting to a distortion of lifeworld pro-
cesses via the incursion of systems impera-
tives. Nevertheless, there always exists the 
possibility that certain forms of action, such 
as strategic action, although emanating from 
the lifeworld itself, are nevertheless parasitic 
on communicative action, thereby hampering 
actors' ability to reach understanding.6 
With this caveat in mind, let us turn now 
to a discussion of Argyris's action research. 
ARGYRIS, SCHON, AND ACTION 
RESEARCH 
For several decades Argyris, Schon, and 
other researchers have been involved in what 
is variably described as "action research," 
"action inquiry," or "action science," a pro-
gram for integrating thought and action, es-
pecially in the context of professional prac-
tice (Argyris 1993a, 1993b; Argyris et a1. 
1985; Argyris and Schon 1974, 1989; Schon 
1983; Torbert 1991; Whyte 1991). Those 
who work as evaluators, planners, consult- . 
ants, psychiatrists, lawyers, architects, case-
workers, and so forth, spend years receiving 
formal and rigorous training in a variety of 
diagnostic techniques that give them effica-
cious means for assessing and intervening in 
their world. . 
Argyris and Schon (1974) provide the fol-
lowing account of the logic underlying their 
own action program: 
All human beings-not only professional prac-
titioners-need to become competent in taking 
action and simultaneously reflecting on the ac-
tion to learn from it. The following pages pro-
vide a conceptual framework for this task by 
analyzing the theories of action that determine 
all deliberate human behavior, how these theo-
ries of action are formed, how they come to 
change, and in what senses they may be con-
sidered adequate or inadequate. (P. 4) 
In the authors' assessment, then, all delibera-
tive action, whether conducted by profes-
sionals in a work setting or by laypersons in 
the course of their everyday lives, is based 
upon some theory of action or conduct, how-
ever tacit or unthematized this theory may be 
in the minds of actors. The authors suggest 
that one of the primary goals of their pro-
gram is to help identify what they call "theo-
ries-in-use," that is, the actual assumptions, 
6 As we shall see later, Habermas argues that 
dramaturgical action is parasitic on communica-
tive action as well. 
knowledge, orientations, and strategies 
undergirding and informing the actual social 
practices of individuals in given situations. 
As Argyris and Schon (1974) state, "Theo-
ries-in-use are means for getting what we 
want. They specify strategies for resolving 
conflicts, making a living, closing a deal, or-
ganizing a neighborhood-indeed, for every 
kind of intended consequence" (p. 15). 
Argyris and Schon are careful to distin-
guish theories-in-use from mere "espoused 
theories," the latter being those theories of 
action to which actors or organizations give 
written or spoken allegiance. The idea is that 
we cannot be certain of deriving a person's 
theories-in-use simply by asking why he or 
she did X or Y under condition Z; a person 
may not even be aware of incompatibilities 
between their espoused theories and theo-
ries-in-use. Likewise, an organization may 
have a written code of directives or a formal 
manifest pertaining to organizational goals or 
purpose: yet their overtly stated position-
the organization's "espoused theory"-may 
not align with actual organizational prac-
tices.7 
Argyris and Schon's (1974) research 
points to a particular model that accounts for 
persons' typical theories-in-use, which they 
refer to as "Model I." This model designates 
(1) a group of governing variables, or the 
goals research study participants strove to 
achieve; (2) action strategies, these being the 
actual strategies participants adopted; (3) 
consequences for the behavioral world; and 
(4) consequences for learning. 
7 Argyris and Schon, citing Scott (1969), illus-
trate the incompatibility between espoused theo-
ries and theories-in-use among workers in an 
agency for the blind. The organization's official 
position, as represented in written documents and 
employee testimony (its espoused theory), holds 
that "the blind are potentially independent, that 
agencies for the blind function to help the blind 
realize that potential. The theories-in-use, how-
ever, assume that the blind are basically depen-
dent on the agencies, that it is a function of the 
agencies to sustain the dependence through con-
tinuing service, and that the function of a blind 
person is to adapt to life in an agency setting" 
(Argyris and Schon 1974:8). Note also that this 
idea parallels Goffman' s discussions of virtual 
versus actual identity (1963b) and total institu-
tions (1961 a). 
Particularly important are the conse-
quences for the behavioral world resulting 
from the various action strategies employed 
by research study participants and the gov-
erning variables underlying these strategies. 
For example, if an actor's primary orienta-
tion to the world is to define goals and try to 
achieve them (the famous ends-means 
schema), then a typical action strategy would 
be to design and manage the environment 
unilaterally (e.g., by being persuasive or by 
appealing to larger goals). When actors find 
themselves in such situations or perceive 
situations in such a light, the consequences 
for the behavioral world are such that actors 
are seen by others as defensive (e.g., having 
to defend a particular line of action or pro-
vide rationale), as inconsistent (e.g., in cases 
where the chosen means don't appear to 
align well with desired or stated ends), as 
competitive, controlling, manipulative, or 
any number of other negative consequences. 
The implications of Model I, according to 
Argyris and Schon (1974), is that, other 
things being equal, behavior is typically de-
fensive and ultimately dysfunctional. This 
defensiveness is passed on across genera-
tions, as children are socialized into or learn 
Model I behavior from their parents, peers, 
and significant others insofar as the behav-
ioral worlds of the family, school, and else-
where conform to the assumptions of Model 
I (Argyris and Schon 1974:82). As Argyris 
and Schon (1974) state, 
Adults programmed with these [Model I] val-
ues tend to create human relationships that em-
phasize competitiveness, withholding help 
from others, conformity, covert antagonism, 
and mistrust while deemphasizing cooperation, 
helping others, individuality, and trust. (P. 83) 
The authors then make an assertion that 
has grave implications for my work on Goff-
man, Habermas, and communicative action: 
Because th~se dysfunctional Model I values 
are embedded in our culture and remain there 
as unseen or unthematized aspects of daily 
life, they are "confirmed" by societal mem-
bers and act as real, authentic, natural, or in-
evitable guidelines for directing groups or 
individuals in their dealings with one an-
other. Hence, "Interpersonal diplomacy, be-
ing civilized, withholding feelings, and sup-
pressing anger and hurt are but a few com-
mon examples of what individuals are taught 
to do to help maintain harmony in interper-
sonal relationships" (Argyris and Schon 
1974:83). 
Argyris and Schon argue that the tools of 
interpersonal diplomacy-things like defer-
ence and demeanor, politeness, embarrass-
ment, norms of etiquette, face work, reme-
dial and supportive interchanges, accounts 
and apologies, tolerance, access rituals, and 
role distance (Goffman 1953, 1959, 1961b, 
1963a, 1967, 1969, 1971, 1974, 1981)-ac-
tually support Model I, thereby sustaining 
and perpetuating the dysfunctional behaviors 
associated with it. In fact, from the perspec-
tive of Argyris and Schon, Goffman's life-
long work was dedicated to unearthing, de-
scribing, and systematizing humanity's de-
structive but "natural" Model I behavior. 8 
What this implies, then, is that Goffman's 
description of the interaction order, and the 
vast array of interpersonal rituals contained 
therein, amounts to documenting the ways 
persons go about the business of living and 
coping in a world of "pseudo-authenticity." 
Model I generates and regenerates a state of 
pseudo-authenticity, especially insofar as 
persons tend to minimize negative feelings 
and their expression. 
As we have seen, then, the governing vari-
ables of Model I consist of competitive, win/ 
R I argue (Chriss forthcoming) that the behav-
iors that Argyris and Schon describe as self-seal-
ing, defensive, and ultimately destructive actually 
embody the negational self. The negational self 
is a self by default in that most public declara-
tions of self amount to specifying what the self is 
not. This can be accomplished through role dis-
tancing or through self-effacement and modesty 
about the self. Through these behaviors persons 
attempt to demonstrate the ideals of a well-de-
meaned individual. Habermas (1984), too, sides 
with Argyris and Schon in emphasizing truth-tell-
ing as part and parcel to reasoned communication, 
thereby tending to cast politeness and other eti-
quette norms into the realm of the irrational since 
they can work to mask persons' truthful assess-
ments of a situation. Kingwell (1993:392) warns, 
however, that any reconstruction of rational pre-
suppositions in communication, such as embod-
ied in Habermas's theory of communicative ac-
tion, would have to include those propositions as-
sociated with politeness, especially as specified 
by Grice (1975) and Goffman (e.g., 1959, 1967, 
1963a, 1971). 
lose, rational, and diplomatic behaviors that 
are "self-sealing.,,9 These are examples of 
what Habermas (1984, 1987) would call "sys-
tematically distorted communication." For 
most large-scale organizations, distorted 
communication is a day-to-day, operational 
reality. As Forester (1989) explains, 
Whether in the public or private sector, organi-
zations are not egalitarian utopias; differences 
of status, power and authority, information and 
expertise, interests and desires abound. Those 
realities-including the incompetent manager, 
the arrogant section head, the misinformed 
staff analyst, the fight between developer and 
regulator-cannot be wished away. (P. 8) 
It is no great revelation that much of the 
dysfunctional Model I behavior with which 
Argyris and Schon are concerned is ex-
pressed or expressible in talk. Likewise, it is 
no surprise that the corrective measures 
which they propound-as specified in their 
"Model II" program of theories-in-use-are 
targeted at organizational communication 
and face-to-face behavior. 
Argyris and Schon (1974) suggest that 
Model II's governing variables are an im-
provement over Modell's because they are 
not self-sealing, but instead tend to permit 
more effective testing of interactants' as-
sumptions and greater learning about one's 
effectiveness as a communicator and/or inter-
preter. For example, the primary governing 
variable of Model II, namely maximizing 
valid information, means that an actor pro-
vides others with directly observable data so 
that others may make valid attributions about 
the actor (Argyris and Schon 1974:86). The 
organizational consultant's job, then, is to 
show organizational actors how to make the 
transition from Model I-self-sealing behav-
ior-to Model II-open and honest behavior 
based on maximizing valid information, 
maximizing free and informed choices, and 
maximizing internal commitments to deci-
sions made. Argyris and Schon spell out in 
some detail the steps that instructors typi-
9 "Self-sealing" behavior is behavior that closes 
off public testing of the assumptions of one's or 
other's theories-in-use, thereby reducing learning 
and hence freezing actors in static and potentially 
destructive worlds. An example of the self-seal-
ing process is as follows. Actor A believes that 
actor B is defensive: If A cannot test this belief 
cally take in helping participants actually 
learn Model II behavior (see 1974:110-136). 
The differences between Habermas and 
Goffman is thus illuminated by the analysis 
of the work of consultants, especially those 
who are considered experts in the observa-
tion of face-to-face interaction in a variety of 
settings-often organizational ones. 
The empirical context thus established, I 
now return to Habermas's theory itself. In an 
attempt to describe and clarify the methods 
of reasoning employed by Habermas in his 
Theory of Communicative Action (1984, 
1987), Baldamus (1992: 100) provided a ci-
tation analysis of that work. Not surprisingly, 
Baldamus found that of the 220 authors cited 
by Habermas, the top 5 were (by total num-
ber of citations) Parsons (180), Weber (140), 
Durkheim (76), Mead (75), and Marx (69). 
Much further down the list, cited only 4 
times, is Goffman. I evaluate Habermas's 
brief treatment of Goffman and suggest the 
ways in which Goffman's theory might help 
connect Habermas's overtly analytical theory 
of communicative action to the empirical so-
cial world. 
HABERMAS ON THE CONCEPTS OF 
TELEOLOGICAL, NORMATIVE, 
DRAMATURGICAL, AND 
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 
Habermas (1984) defines "communicative 
action" as "the interaction of at least two 
subjects capable of speech and action who 
establish interpersonal relations (whether by 
verbal or by extra-verbal means)" (p. 86).10 
and if A acts according to his hunch, B probably 
wonders why A is behaving in this way. There-
fore B acts cautiously. A senses B's caution and 
may interpret it as evidence that B is indeed de-
fensive. A believes that if he were to reveal his 
feeling that B is defensive, his relationship with 
B would become less manageable. A's reluctance 
to confront B means that B in turn need not con-
front the incongruity between B' s espoused 
theory and his theory-in-use. But also as a result, 
A's behavior is incongruent with his values. The 
norms supporting incongruity and minimizing ex-
pression of negative feelings are reinforced. 
thereby exacerbating A's negative or uncertain 
feelings about B (Argyris and Schon 1974:77). 
10 This obviously excludes so-called "self-
talk." Goffman (1978, 1981) deals with specific 
Obviously, language is itself prominent in 
Habermas's model-it is the medium 
through which individuals interpret each 
other's plans of action while negotiating defi-
nitions of the situation. Ideally these nego-
tiations, if they are to lead at all to a final 
(even if only provisional) definition of the 
situation, must first and foremost define con-
sensus among the participants. 
This process of achieving understanding 
through language is for Habermas the defin-
ing problem in the theory of communicative 
action. As Habermas (1984) explains, "The 
concept of reaching an understanding sug-
gests a rationally motivated agreement 
among participants that is measured against 
criticizable validity claims" (p. 75). Haber-
mas's theory of communicative action, then, 
attempts to treat rationality from a universal-
istic perspective. That is, in attempting to de-
lineate the normative foundations of a criti-
cal theory, Habermas suggests that these es-
sential concrete norms are implicit in the va-
lidity claims of all speech. 
Habermas then expands this provisional 
concept of communicative rationality by ana-
lyzing the ontological assumptions of ratio-
nality embedded in a variety of social-scien-
tific theories of action. Habermas (1984:85) 
suggests that this "profusion of action con-
cepts" can be reduced in essence "to four ba-
sic, analytically distinguishable concepts" or 
theoretical traditions: (1) teleological action, 
(2) normatively regulated action, (3) drama-
turgical action, and (4) his own communica-
tive action. 
Habermas evaluates the worthiness and so-
phistication of the four theoretical perspec-
tives on action with respect to how each sat-
isfies the criteria of a three-world model. 
Habermas's (1984:95) three analytical 
worlds correspond to the three ways social 
actors relate to the everyday world, namely, 
objectively, socially, and subjectively. This 
threefold relation of communicative actors to 
their world identifies different forms or di-
forms of self-talk, such as imprecations and 
curses (e.g., "ouch!," "damn!," "jeez!," "oops!"). 
Habermas (1979) chastises Goffman, however, 
for lumping together identity-threatening acts, 
which are authentic emotional-expressive in-
stances of self-talk, with spill cries, such as those 
mentioned above, which are more impulsive and 
not overtly calculated as face-saving devices. 
mensions of understanding that members of 
a society gain as a result of their interaction 
with others as well as through other routine 
social practices. Habermas argues that the 
four theoretical perspectives on action vary 
in the extent to which each is able to illumi-
nate these relations. He lists these theories in 
rank order: Teleological action is at the weak 
end of the explanatory spectrum, and pro-
gressing to the most efficacious of the theo-
ries, Habermas's own communicative action 
theory is at the strong end. 
Teleological Action 
Since teleological concepts of action-such 
as those of utilitarianism, behaviorism, or ra-
tional-choice theory-emphasize primarily 
the strategic or goal-oriented calculations ac-
tors employ in pursuing courses of action, 
Habermas suggests that this concept can only 
account for one world, namely the objective 
world. As the actor is engaged in a decision 
calculus that takes into account the elements 
of his or her action options in relation to the 
constraints and exigencies of the objective 
world, the intended effect in the world or the 
results of his or her strivings will in the end 
be judged a success or failure according to 
criteria of truth and efficacy (Habermas 
1984:87). The implications of teleological 
theory is that action, as realized through the 
cognitive processes of a knowing subject, is 
represented only as a relation between the 
actor and a world. At the level of its onto-
logical presuppositions, then, teleological 
action operates from a highly demarcated, 
and for Habermas's purposes, insufficient 
one-world concept. 
Normatively Regulated Action 
Whereas teleological action operates from a 
limited one-world perspective, normatively 
regulated action (such as Parsons) presup-
poses relations between an actor and two 
worlds (Habermas 1984:88). Actors depicted 
in the normatively regulated concept of ac-
tion are endowed with a "motivational com-
plex" in addition to teleology's lower-level 
"cognitive complex." The motivational com-
plex makes norm-conformative behavior pos-
sible in that actors judge whether or not the 
actions of themselves or another actor are in 
accord with eXisting norms (Habermas 
1984:89). Beyond providing judgments of 
the extent to which actions are successful or 
unsuccessful in relation to the objective 
world, the normatively regulated model of 
action also provides for judgments of an ac-
tor in his or her relation to the social world, 
insofar as the actor is able to comply with 
(or is unable or chooses not to meet) the nor-
mative expectations of the members of his or 
her social group. This is a two-world model 
because, as Habermas (1984) explains, the 
concept of norm-con formative action "pre-
supposes that the agent can distinguish the 
factual [objective] from the normative ele-
ments of an action situation, that is, condi-
tions and means from values" (p. 90). 
Goffman's Dramaturgical Model of Action 
Habermas then discusses the concept of 
dramaturgical action. Like normatively regu-
lated action, dramaturgical action provides a 
two-world model, the two worlds comprising 
the objective and subjective dimensions of an 
actor's relation to the world. Goffman's actor 
"works the system for the enhancement of 
self' through self-presentation and impres-
sion management. This idea is, for Habermas, 
strongly reminiscent of the kind of goal-
orientedness characteristic of teleological 
(strategic) action. As Habermas (1984) states, 
"The dramaturgical qualities of action are in 
a certain way parasitic; they rest on a struc-
ture of goal-directed action" (p. 90). 
In addition to the objective world, drama-
turgical action depicts a subjective world; 
actors involved in self-presentation must 
form a "visible public" with regard to their 
audience. For the theorist, then, this model of 
action opens up a subjective world of actors 
making "staged presentations" before a group 
of others. In other words, we peer inside the 
"black box" of the subjective workings lurk-
ing behind and animating an actor's overt 
behavior. As Habermas (1984) explains, the 
concept of dramaturgical action suggests that 
"the actor is oriented to his own subjective 
world in the presence of his public" (p. 93). 
Important to note here is that unlike the 
concept of normatively regulated action, 
Habermas argues that dramaturgical action 
does not allow for understanding or explain-
ing the social world. In fact, he suggests that 
all three of the aforementioned action con-
cepts are deficient with respect to at least one 
of the three worlds. 
Although each of the concepts (teleologi-
cal, normatively regulated, and dramaturgi-
cal action) presupposes the importance of 
language in explaining an actor's relation to 
the world, Habermas suggests that only com-
municative action incorporates language as a 
medium for reasoned or noncoerced action-. 
a medium through which actors can actually 
gain understanding and consensus as mem-
bers of a societal community. As Habermas 
(1984) explains, 
Only the communicative model of action pre-
supposes language as a medium of uncurtailed 
communication whereby speakers and hearers, 
out of the context of their preinterpreted 
Iifeworld, refer simultaneously to things in the 
objective, social, and subjective worlds in or-
der to negotiate common definitions of the situ-
ation. (P. 95) 
It is my position that Habermas's diagno-
sis of the deficiencies of teleological, norma-
tively regulated, and dramaturgical concepts 
of action in explicating certain dimensions of 
his three-world model is for the most part 
sound. However, I explore further Haber-
mas's judgment that dramaturgical action 
fails to adequately specify actors' relations 
to the social world. I believe, in fact, that 
Habermas's theory of communicative action 
may be fruitfully recast through the prism of 
Goffman's (1974) frame analysis, especially 
with reference to "The Frame Analysis of 
Talk" (Goffman 1974, chap. 13:496-559).11 
Before moving on, however, I first review 
II Because Habermas published Communicative 
Action in 1981 (translated from German in 1984), 
it is perhaps the case that he had not yet read 
Goffman's Frame Analysis, which was first pub-
lished in 1974 (and translated into German in 
1980). Habermas never cites Frame Analysis, and 
it is hard to imagine that he would have come to 
the same conclusions regarding the inadequacies 
of dramaturgical action for his own theory of com-
municative action had he been familiar with its 
major arguments. However, Habermas (1979) was 
familiar with a paper of Goffman's-"Response 
Cries" (Goffman 1978)-which later appeared in 
an edited volume on human ethology (von 
Cranach, Foppa, Lepenies, and Ploog 1979) and 
then was included in Goffman's Forms of Talk 
(1981). However, Goffman does not refer to or 
mention Frame Analysis anywhere in that paper. 
Habermas's discussion of validity claims and 
the rationality assumptions underlying com-
municative action. 
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, RATION-
ALITY, AND VALIDITY CLAIMS 
To reiterate, Habermas is concerned first and 
foremost with an analytical program that, 
through the generative assumptions of uni-
versalizable ethics (norms) and social actors' 
capacity for moral reasoning and rationality 
(Benhabib 1992:24), attempts to delineate 
criteria for and the possibility for nonco-
erced, or communicative, action. The prob-
lem of rationality is thus reintroduced in 
Habermas insofar as the conditions for such 
a communicatively achieved, reasonable 
consensus among actors must be grounded 
in the possibility of actors' communicative 
rationality, this being "the competency to ar-
gue and the imperative of responsibility 
[through language]" (Hinkle 1992:317; also 
see Hayim 1992). 
Habermas's attempt to designate criteria 
for noncoerced, or communicative, action 
hinges on the explication of three validity 
claims that represent the binding force of 
communicative acts. A speaker raises all of 
the following validity claims with his or her 
utterances, as every speech act could be con-
tested on the following grounds: 
(1) Hearer can contest the normative right-
ness of the utterance (social world). 
(2) Hearer can contest the subjective truth-
fulness of the utterance (subjective 
world). 
(3) Hearer can deny that certain existential 
presuppositions obtain (objective world). 
Habermas (1984) offers the following ex-
ample to illustrate these validity claims: 
A seminar student understands the following 
request by a professor: "Please bring me a glass 
of water." (P. 306) 
As this is not a simple imperative or sheer 
expression of will, but a speech act carried 
out in an "attitude oriented to understand-
ing," the student may contest its validity with 
the following responses: 
(1) No. You can't treat me like one of your 
employees [contesting the normative right-
ness of the utterance]. 
(2) No. You really only want to put me in a 
bad light in front of the other seminar par-
ticipants [contesting the subjective truth-
fulness of the utterance]. 
(3) No. The next water tap is so far away that I 
couldn't get back before the end of the ses-
sion [denying that the appropriate objective 
conditions obtain]. (Habermas 1984:306; 
comments in brackets added by author) 
The student is, in the first case, contesting 
the action of the professor; in the second, 
contesting that the professor means what he 
says; in the third, denying the truth of propo-
sitions the professor has presupposed in the 
given situation. This holds, according to 
Habermas, for all speech acts oriented to 
reaching understanding. 
Habermas attempts to somehow find a way 
to institute the binding normative (moral) 
conditions obtaining in the "ideal speech 
situation" across the entire societal commu-
nity. He admits that this is, at present, a 
purely utopian goal, as he is unable to locate 
instances of communicative action at the in-
stitutional level within modern, Western so-
ciety (see Sciulli 1989, 1992a, 1992b). It is, 
first and foremost, the problem of modernity, 
what Habermas refers to as the shearing off 
of system from the lifeworld. 12 But unlike 
many critics of modernity, Habermas is un-
willing to reject the project of Enlighten-
ment, which he construes as the quest for the 
rational foundations of a critical sociology. 
This quest is, I believe, worthwhile and im-
portant, and hence my concern is to help 
reach this goal by attempting to link Haber-
mas's analytical theory of communicative 
action to the empirical social world. In a 
somewhat more critical vein, I suggest that 
Habermas must take more seriously Goff-
12 In attempting to complete the project of mo-
dernity, Habermas knows full well the sorts of 
social pathologies that must be addressed to de-
fend modernity against recent post modern 
(meta)critiques (especially those of Lyotard, Fou-
cault and BaudriIlard). Habermas' s "shearing off 
of the Iifeworld" equates to a concern with the 
deleterious effects of instrumental rationality on 
the everyday social world (lifeworld). The ongo-
ing rationalization of society has caused a split 
between system and Iifeworld. This implies two 
forms of societal integration: (\) The Iifeworld is 
integrated by communicative action, whereby ac-
tors work to achieve consensus through language; 
man's (1959, 1981, 1983a, 1983b) insights 
into the forms of talk that occur in the gen-
eral context of human communication forged 
through simple co-presence (i.e., the "inter-
action order"). 
BRINGING GOFFMAN BACK IN 
Habermas's concern with the problem of cur-
tailed communication, and of communication 
more generally, is shared by Goffman. That 
is, like Habermas, Goffman spent his entire 
career investigating communicative action or 
conduct, but from an empirical or ethno-
graphic perspective, not an overtly analytical 
one. In his dissertation, "Communication 
Conduct in an Island Community," Goffman 
(1953) explains, "As the study progressed, 
conversational interaction came to be seen as 
one species of social order" (p. 1). And later, 
citing Parsons (1951) and Barnard (1947), 
Goffman lays out the fundamental assump-
tion underlying his sociological model of 
communication: "I assume that conversa-
tional interaction between concrete persons 
who are in each other's immediate presence 
is a species of social order and can be stud-
ied by applying the model of social order to 
it" (p. 33). 
Whereas Habermas's rationality assump-
tions are explicitly stated as three validity 
claims, the assumption of rationality is only 
implicit in Goffman, as Parsons and others 
had already worked out sophisticated sche-
mata to explain the place of rationality in so-
cial order, or rather, in the "constitution" of 
social actors operating within the social sys-
tem. The closest Goffman ever comes to di-
rectly dealing with the rationality problem is 
through his theory of normal appearances 
(2) at the systems level, functional integration in-
tertwines action with their consequences. The lat-
ter form of integration is guided by the 
"objectivating attitude," the former by the 
"performative attitude." Because abstract and 
generalized criteria are encompassed in many fac-
ets of life (e.g., legal norms, economic action, the 
norm of cognitive rationality), the "system" may 
be seen as operating with a life of its own, with 
little or no reference to the actual activity of par-
ticipants of the lifeworld. This system domination 
occurs through the ongoing rationalization (or 
what Habermas calls the "colonization") of the 
lifeworld. 
(see Goffman 1971). That is, per the drama-
turgical theory of action, social actors 
learn-first through socialization and then 
through imitation and experience-the tacit 
cultural codes signaling an actor's proper de-
meanor while in the presence of others. 
Goffman's actor can thus modify presenta-
tions of self appropriately to "fit" any par-
ticular interaction episode so as to signal to 
those present that he or she is a reasoned or 
"rational" actor (i.e., that he or she is a rati-
fied participant in the social proceedings, 
that he or she belongs there, that he or she is 
not "crazy" or deranged, that he or she is not 
a threat). An actor's minimum requirements 
for maintaining normal appearances through 
the display of his or her verbal and/or non-
verbal actions means that no undue alarm is 
signaled to others present. 
Goffman and Habermas part company on 
the epistemological assumptions embedded 
within each of their theories that pertain to 
each theorist's ability to conceptualize what 
is going on in the minds of social actors; call 
it the problem of Verstehen, or phenomeno-
logical "intersubjectivity," or more generally, 
subjective understanding. Habermas, in 
viewing dramaturgical action, operates ex-
plicitly with a "black box" concept of action 
(to be discussed more fully below). Goffman 
however rejects this position in his own theo-
ries. For Goffman, Habermas's view of com-
munication is overly rationalistic. To under-
stand this divergence, we turn to Goffman's 
Frame Analysis (1974), specifically his dis-
cussion of the "Frame Analysis of Talk." 
Goffman's Frame Analysis of Talk 
The one thing that makes the idea of com-
municative action possible is that, using lan-
guage, disparate actors can reach consensus 
on issues at hand. Goffman's idea of linguis-
tic competence is close to Habermas's: Indi-
viduals in the presence of others possess cul-
tural competence in that they are generally 
able to avoid misunderstandings in their ev-
eryday communication. (Notice though, for 
example, the "cute mistakes" that children 
are allowed in their speech; they are assumed 
to lack a fully developed communicative 
competence. ) Goffman discusses conversa-
tion-the traditional view of which "assumes 
an easy exchange of speaker-hearer role 
[whereby participants are] engaged in a con-
summatory moment" (Goffman 1974:498)-
merely as a foil. Habermas shares this tradi-
tional, hyperrational view of conversation, 
and as a consequence tends to gloss over the 
actual social context of talk, which, I would 
suggest, Goffman has successfully incorpo-
rated. In other words, Habermas needs Gof-
fman's fuller communication paradigm to 
flesh out his own theory of communicative 
action. 
From Goffman's perspective, all utter-
ances, whether formal or informal, regulative, 
expressive, constative, directive, commissive, 
or declarative-are first and foremost an-
chored in the surrounding world. 13 As he 
(Goffman 1974:500) states, "utterances take 
up a place in the world"; they are, following 
Durkheim, "social facts." Utterances produce 
reactions or orientations of actors, thereby 
contributing to the production of an ongoing 
social world. Most important from the per-
spective of dramaturgy, talk is always a 
project imbued with "structured suspense" 
(Goffman 1974:506). 
Suspense in talk implies that "we spend 
most of our time not engaged in giving infor-
mation but in giving shows" (Goffman 1974: 
508). The implications for Habermas's 
project are staggering. Habermas's theory is 
driven by an information paradigm. That is, 
social life is more or less a continuous battle 
over the status, the validity, the appropriate-
ness, the truthfulness, of knowledge claims-
the problem of information exchange and 
transfer drives Habermas's theory. But for 
Goffman, talk constitutes not only bald state-
ments of fact; talk is also about recounting, 
about "story-telling." Much of talk consists 
of replayings in which a storyteller maintains 
the listeners' suspense. This suspense pro-
vides frames for the organization of talk. 
The purely informational perspective 
(Habermas) leads, in Goffman's view, to an 
unacceptably utilitarian view of talk or com-
munication. The "rational recounting" of 
13 As Collins and Makowsky (1993:268) note, 
Habermas attaches one particular type of speech 
act, namely expressives, to Goffman's dramatur-
gical theory of action in that for Habermas, ac-
tors represent (or can misrepresent) their subjec-
tive states or inner selves to others through dra-
matic presentation. 
facts between participants in communication 
implies the black-box model of interactants 
(Goffman 1974:511). Furthermore, continues 
GOffman, "this utilitarianlike approach to 
speech ill equips us for what individuals ac-
tually do during speaking" (p. 512). The 
black-box model of information exchange is 
a simplification because in actuality the "in-
sides of the actor's head are exposed in ways 
other than through voluntary statements or 
involuntary leakage" (p. 514). Going beyond 
the black-box model, Goffman (1974:515) 
gives examples of non utilitarian talk such as 
"collusive communication," whereby one can 
"conceal speech behind speech" by convey-
ing information via sarcasm, irony, innu-
endo, or simple fun. Habermas deals some-
what inadequately with the collusive frame, 
and would tend to write it off as strategic ac-
tion, which, in any case, would not meet his 
standards for communicative action. 
Goffman (1974) suggests that the "tradi-
tional model of the actor whose facial fea-
tures are his evidential boundary does not fit 
the facts but instead somehow overration-
alizes man" (p. SIS). However, notice that an 
actor may guide his or her behavior to fit the 
black-box model-to align with normative 
strictures of the perceived moral universe: In 
Goffman's (1974) words, "he has guided his 
conduct so as to ensure this fit, sustaining a 
human nature to fit the frame" (p. 516). This 
is Goffman's "normal appearances," which 
Habermas mistakes for first-level rational ac-
tion. Goffman illustrates the complexity, the 
frame-within-a-frame possibilities, of rea-
soned communication. 
Additionally, Habermas says very little 
about what Goffman refers to as the "ritual 
frame of talk." This is when listener provides 
to speaker an intermittent stream of support-
ive gestures: "uh-huhs," "yeahs," nods of the 
head, sustaining eye contact so as to signal 
interest in the talk, and so forth. This ritual 
frame reflects the accommodating pattern of 
face-to-face interaction. The speaker, of 
course, also plays a role in accommodation, 
as the "life of talk consists principally of re-
living," or replaying, sustained by suspense 
(Goffman 1974:547). In other words, naked 
performative utterances, such as a bridge 
player's bid of "three clubs," are only a mi-
nuscule element of the frame of talk. What is 
important, especially if we are to link Haber-
mas's theory to the empirical social world, is 
that in talk a person always frames him- or 
herself from view. An important quote from 
Goffman (1974) illustrates this point: 
To say that he [the speaker] assumes a role and 
presents himself through it is already a bias in 
the direction of wholeness and authenticity. 
What he does is to present a one-man show. He 
animates. (P. 547) 
This animation is the speaker's agency, his 
or her "doing of the moment." There often 
are, as Habermas has rightly noted, true feel-
ings and attitudes expressed in talk, and in-
ner states can be documented (the famous 
black-box). "But," as Goffman (1974) sug-
gests, "these displays are not some privileged 
access to the biological innards of the 
speaker, for they are properly to be attributed 
to a figure animated, not the animator" (p. 
547). This is Goffman's (1983b) notion of 
"loose coupling," the difference between the 
mythic and the performance text-or the 
slippages that occur between social structure 
and individual human acts. 
Goffman (1974) makes this extremely im-
portant point: "Everyday life, which is real 
enough in itself, often seems to be a lami-
nated adumbration of a pattern or model that 
is itself a typification of quite uncertain 
realm status" (p. 562). This is what Garfinkel 
(1967) and others have described as the "per-
ceived moral universe," the normative view 
of the world that individual actors carry 
around in their heads, or what Durkheim re-
fers to as the "collective conscience." From 
Goffman's perspective, everyday activity 
provides an original against which copies can 
be struck. 
Attempting to Reconcile Goffman and 
Habermas 
As we have seen, Habermas's goal is to out-
line a research program for a universal prag-
matics that identifies and reconstructs the 
universal conditions of possible understand-
ing between actors. This goal, of course, 
turned Habermas's attention toward the 
realm of "practical discourse," and to specify 
the criteria or conditions for possible nonco-
erced action, this practical discourse must be 
aimed at "understanding" rather than at 
"success ." 
For Habermas then, "success" is an overly 
strategic orientation that often overrides the 
more crucial goal of "understanding" in ac-
tion or communication. What Goffman's ob-
servations on talk help us see, however, is 
that Habermas's distinction between "suc-
cess" and "understanding" in talk is an over-
specification of a process that may be imper-
vious, at least at this time, to the sort of ana-
lytical fine-tuning Habermas seeks. Granted, 
persons often "put on shows" in talk, they 
may attempt to deceive, and there are often 
calculated shifts in the alignment of speak-
ers and hearers (what Goffman calls shifts in 
"footing") as the context of the talk dictates 
(Goffman 1981: 127). But much of this seem-
ingly "strategic" action is not necessarily ori-
ented to success, that is, a speaker's instru-
mental attempt to achieve some goal at the 
expense of his or her audience (see Rawls 
1987:143-44). In fact speakers do indeed at-
tempt to achieve understanding through 
talk-Habermas's communicative action-
and they utilize the props, mechanisms, and 
processes that Habermas erroneously con-
demns as evidence of a speaker's strategic or 
coercive intent. 14 
Much of the content of talk is, as Goffman 
shows, suffused with the very human attempt 
to illustrate to others through speaker's talk 
the presence of a stable, concerted self (see 
my discussion of the "negational self' [Chriss 
forthcoming]). In other words, everyday life 
is guided by fictive or romanticized ideals 
(norms) about the way life ought to be con-
ducted. We learn to comport ourselves to ren-
der our activities as agreeable to others, and 
to show through our presentations that we 
have a consistent, stable persona to which our 
identity is connected. As Goffman (1974) 
suggests, "Indeed, in countless ways and 
ceaselessly, social life takes up and freezes 
14 Collins and Makowsky (1993) make much 
the same point, suggesting that Habermas seems 
to view Goffman's theory as concerned primarily 
with the ways that actors express or conceal sub-
jective states before a group of others. But, as I 
argue here, this view of Goffman is overly nar-
row. Rather, "The self may be a 'sacred object' 
to which we give ritual respect, but by the same 
token it is also a modern myth which actually 
fluctuates with the footings one takes in different 
levels of social interaction" (Collins and Makow-
sky 1993:270; also Chriss 1993). 
into itself the understandings we have of it" 
(p.563). 
It is no wonder, then, that Goffman dedi-
cated so much of his professional energies to 
mapping out where, how, and to what extent 
"real" life becomes theatrics or even down-
right deception. In effect, Habermas's ana-
lytical program attempts to pick up from 
Goffman's (and before him, Bateson's 
[1972]) starting point by suggesting that 
there is a way to make such a distinction, this 
being the distinction between authentic (non-
coerced) and inauthentic (coerced or staged) 
communication. 
The problem of communicative action, un-
derstood in this way, leads us to consider the 
following from Goffman (1974): 
Life may not be an imitation of art, but ordi-
nary conduct, in a sense, is an imitation of the 
proprieties, a gesture at the exemplary forms, 
and the primal realization of these ideals be-
longs more to make-believe than to reality. (P. 
562) 
Persons in talk, according to Goffman, al-
ways walk a tightrope along the reality/make-
believe continuum, not because there is nec-
essarily some devious or underhanded reason 
for doing so, but because of the inherently 
tenuous and shifting positions speakers oc-
cupy while talking. Goffman's (1981:147) 
idea of "embedding" suggests just this; that 
as speakers we represent ourselves through 
the personal pronoun "I." As speakers we are 
a figure in a statement, a protagonist in a dra-
matic event told (or retold). 
When we refer to ourselves in talk, we 
necessarily speak of someone who inhabits 
the world that is spoken about, not necessar-
ily the world of current talk. It is first and 
foremost a knowledge claim, but not in the 
way Habermas would designate. That is, the 
referencing of self in talk through use of the 
personal pronoun allows for a tremendous 
flexibility of presentationes) of self before an 
audience (Bell 1984). In effect, we each have 
at our disposal a wide array of naturally oc-
curring dramatic personae from which to 
draw in normal everyday speech, and this is 
not alarming. IS 
15 For example, "hedges" and "qualifiers," in 
the form of performative modal verbs (e.g., I 
"wish," "think," "could," "hope," etc.) introduce 
distance between a speaker's figure and its 
avowal (Goffman 1981: 148). 
But in modern industrial societies, bur-
geoning populations and increased levels of 
anonymity are a feature of everyday interac-
tion. In this environment, the increased flex-
ibility and decreased accountability of self-
presentations may indeed contribute to the 
rise of a whole new range of framing de-
bates, such as the imbroglios which have 
erupted recently over abortion, speech codes, 
or even sexual harassment. This particular 
line of investigation cannot be pursued fur-
ther here because it would take us too far 
afield (but see Chriss 1994b; Horowitz 1993; 
Wiley 1994). I emphasize, however, that 
conceptualizations of the self, and especially 
the question of the sincerity of the presented 
self (see Tseelon 1992a), are central issues 
in the theory of communicative action. 
ISSUES OF ORGANIZATIONS AND 
PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 
In summarizing my thoughts on Habermas, 
Goffman, and communicative action, I return 
now to issues of organizations and profes-
sional practice-consulting, management, 
evaluation, and planning. One of the areas in 
which sociologists can claim a degree of 
competence is social interaction, or more 
specifically, face-to-face behavior. For ex-
ample, students or disciples of Goffman may 
choose to follow his lead regarding the ob-
servation and understanding of face-to-face 
interaction in naturalistic settings. For re-
searchers so inclined, the dramaturgical 
theory of action provides a general frame-
work for describing, analyzing, assessing, or 
explicating concrete instances of such talk in 
any number of settings, be it a party, an of-
fice meeting, a therapy group session, a ser-
vice transaction, a chess match, a war-
garners convention, or what have you. 
Several years ago I spent the summer 
working for a large philanthropic foundation. 
I was hired to conduct a meta-evaluation of 
the foundation's evaluation research unit. 
Because the foundation prided itself on hav-
ing a "flat" organizational hierarchy, I gen-
erally had free access to all departmental and 
management meetings as well as to key or-
ganizational actors, such as the executive di-
rector and the heads of the various depart-
ments (these being religion, culture, educa-
tion, policy analysis, international affairs, 
communications, and evaluation). Through 
both formal and informal discussions with 
employees of the foundation, it became ap-
parent to many of them that Goffman's work 
was central to my own understanding and in-
terpretation of social behavior. 
Within two weeks of my arrival, I sensed a 
growing uneasiness, and even suspicion, 
among many at the foundation. Much of this 
had to do, I believe, with Goffman's reputa-
tion for turning a jaundiced eye toward orga-
nizations, and organizational actors more 
generally, as evidenced by his infamous 
expose of "total institutions" reported in Asy-
lums (1961 a). What I suggest is that many in 
organizations or organizational studies seem 
to have a one-sided or incomplete view of 
Goffman's theory-one that views him as 
overtly concerned with exposing the dark un-
derbel\y or the "crawlspaces" of organiza-
tions. 16 
Ingram (1986) perhaps best typifies this 
particular sentiment; he suggests that the no-
tion of organizational "underlife" was first 
proposed by Goffman (1961 a). According to 
Ingram's reading of Goffman, the underlife 
of an organization is composed of organiza-
tional members who, while maintaining a 
level of organizational identification and ap-
pearing to fulfil\ organizational roles, engage 
in behaviors that violate organizational ex-
pectations and yield unauthorized rewards. 
The crawlspace of an organization, then, is 
the structure of arrangements that support or 
even promote underlife existence. 
Confronted with this rather negative as-
sessment of Goffman at the foundation, or 
rather, confronted with the abiding conten-
tion that Goffman has little to offer in the 
way of explicating organizational behavior, 
my next step was to determine what litera-
ture or traditions of thought guided the day-
to-day theories-in-use of these professional 
16 There may also exist within organizations 
high levels of skepticism toward intellectuals or 
academicians in general, regardless of their theo-
retical or philosophical orientation, especially 
those who are not well known to members of the 
organization. Kanter's (1977) fieldwork appears 
to confirm this atmosphere of anti-intellectualism 
in formal organizations: "Emphasis was placed 
on getting along, 'keeping your nose clean,' and 
on having a smooth interpersonal style. Introspec-
tion was out. Intellectuals were suspect" (p. 41). 
practitioners, especial\y the evaluators and 
consultants at the foundation with whom I 
had regular contact. 17 
As we saw in an earlier section, a sizable 
portion of the research tradition guiding or-
ganizational evaluators and consultants is 
represented by Argyris's (1993a, 1993b; 
Argyris and Schon 1974, 1989) and Schon's 
(1983) "action research." This tradition is in 
turn derived from Lewin's (1943, 1951) re-
search on smal\ groups, and it is important 
to note here the major aims of Lewin's 
project. As a (psychological) social psy-
chologist, Lewin was attempting to establish 
in systematic fashion the links between an 
individual's behavior and attitudes and cer-
tain characteristics of groups; he devoted at-
tention to the spatial and temporal character-
istics determining group stability or change. 
Lewin's work was original\y formulated 
within the context of problems communities 
typically face with regard to attitude change, 
loyalty, and in-group/out-group relations. 
What emerges, then, from this brief review 
of Lewin's program is the realization that 
Lewin was not satisfied merely to document 
or describe the vagaries of face-to-face be-
havior or group life; his primary goal was to 
understand and establish the conditions un-
der which attitude change could be affected 
or facilitated. As Back (1981) explains, 
The kind of group that emerges from [Lewin's] 
model is one that has meaning for the members 
and that is especially effective in producing or 
preventing attitude change in its members. The 
17 I am not implying here that Ingram's own 
assessment of Goffman is negative. Ingram sim-
ply points out that Goffman's work in Asylums 
was important and influential primarily because 
it documented the ways persons cope in the face 
of the stringent demands of a coercive organiza-
tional or social structure. An underlife then be-
comes a survival tactic, a way of shoring up or 
saving identities under siege. But academics or 
consultants who go into organizations with the 
intent of observing organizational behavior and 
who are known to be sympathetic to Goffman's 
approach may be seen by organizational actors as 
carrying with them an implicit assumption of the 
coercive nature of organizations. This, then, ex-
plains the source of suspicion and negative as-
sessments of the research observer (and of 
Goffman) by organizations or their representa-
tives. 
model thus examines the conditions under 
which members change and begin to exhibit at-
titudes and beliefs similar to the group, or to 
act in a similar way .... Lewin's interest was 
in investigating conditions that could produce 
attitude and habit changes. (Pp. 330-31) 
This instrumentalist, therapeutic impulse 
of Lewin's work was carried over into the 
tradition of organizational behavior (OB), in 
which the aim of research is to help organi-
zations influence change, presumably for the 
better. Argyris's action research (1993a, 
1993b) is one such program in the applied 
social psychology of organizations. IS 
Argyris and Schon (1974) tend to view 
Goffman's characterization of social actors 
(especially his position on impression man-
agement and the presentation of self) as a fair 
approximation of the naturally occurring but 
ultimately destructive tendencies toward self-
sealing, defensive, and insincere behavior. 
This naturally occurring Model I behavior 
could, according to action research, be over-
come through a program that heightens or-
ganizational actors' self-realizations-that 
is, a program that brings actors' espoused 
theories more into line with their actual theo-
ries-in-use. And through this change of atti-
tudes or behaviors, organizational learning 
could thereby be advanced. 
Habermas's program is also based on an 
ameliorative plan, namely the effort to assure 
reasoned or noncoerced communication in 
the face of multiple organizational structures 
supporting inequality and differential power 
that serve to cut off the possibility of con-
sensus or intersubjective understanding 
through fair discussion or argumentation. 
But unlike Lewin's program or the program 
of action research, Habermas does not see 
Goffman's dramaturgical theory of action as 
representing some fundamental, albeit 
flawed, description of the human condition 
that could somehow be overcome through a 
critical program of attitude change or self-re-
alization. This is because Goffman's drama-
turgy cannot assure intersubjective under-
standing between actors because, in 
Habermas's view, it has no way of providing 
18 Lewin's work was also influential in the de-
velopment of the organizational development 
(OD) model of attitude or behavior change (see 
Aguinis 1993; Marshak 1993). 
access to the social (normative) world, one 
of Habermas's three key analytical worlds 
(the others being the objective and subjective 
worlds). In other words, communicative ac-
tion can be realized only if social actors have 
free and undistorted access to the three va-
lidity claims of propositional truth, norma-
tive rightness, and subjective truthfulness. 
CONCLUSION 
How has Habermas's ameliorative program 
of communicative action been received in the 
literature on organizations and professions, 
and how does it compare to the reception of 
Goffman's work? It is safe to say that 
Habermas's work, and critical theory more 
generally, has been much more influential 
and more seriously discussed in these fields 
than has Goffman's work. 19 A good example 
of this is Holmes's (1992) paper, entitled 
"The Drama of Nursing." In the recent litera-
ture on organizations and the professions, 
much has been made of conceiving of pro-
fessions as a form of aesthetic praxis, the 
goal being to provide a more stable analyti-
cal foundation for the concept "profession" 
through the identification and linking of 
these so-called performative practices to the 
concept itself. Holmes's (1992) contrast be-
tween Goffman and critical theory is instruc-
tive for our discussion: 
In contrast to Goffman's dramaturgy, which 
stresses the artifice of social relations and sug-
gests a cynical view of human interactions, a 
critical theory of dramatic praxis introduces a 
normative dimension in which performance 
may become self-realizing and emancipatory as 
it aspires to the status of aesthetic practice. 
Conceived in such terms, nursing practice be-
comes a powerful form of self-expression 
which has the potential to become liberating 
for the nurse and the patient. (P. 941) 
Holmes's insistence that critical theory 
adds a normative dimension to the under-
standing of actors' performances points to 
the same failings of the dramaturgical model 
identified earlier by Habermas, namely that 
Goffman's theory of action cannot explain 
19 See for example Burrell's (1994) overview 
of Habermas's contribution to organizational 
analysis. 
why actors would ever engage, or choose to 
engage, in norm-conformative behavior.2o 
Again, it should be pointed out that this 
incongruity between critical theory and 
Goffman's theory on the issue of actors' ac-
cess to the validity claim that assures, or at 
least makes possible, appropriate social re-
lations and normative rightness, evolves 
from a disagreement over the ontology of 
self-presentation and impression manage-
ment. I have already discussed at some 
length Goffman's position and my own de-
fense of him on this issue, and the reasons 
for this disagreement should now be clear. 
In the final analysis, the contention between 
Habermas and Goffman comes down to a 
fundamental question: Is the presented self a 
sincere self? As I suggested in my attempt 
to reconcile the views of Goffman and 
Habermas (pp. 13-14), Tseelon (l992a, 
20 For an even more explicit treatment of 
Habermas's importance to nursing practice, see 
Porter (1994). Even given this preference for 
Habermas or critical theory over Goffman among 
authors concerned with issues of professional 
practice, Habermas's program is nevertheless 
viewed by many as overly abstract and hopelessly 
detached from the empirical social world. 
Robinson's (1994) discussion of Habermas with 
respect to the field of education and pedagogy is 
iIIustrati ve of this sentiment: "[Habermas' sl work 
does not provide a methodology that is applicable 
to the conduct or evaluation of dialogical prac-
tice. Habermas's theory of communicative action 
is concerned to defend an ideal of rationality, 
founded in the universal presuppositions of 
speech, and this ideal cannot be directly applied 
to everyday situations" (p. 72). What we need, 
suggests authors such as Robinson (1994), 
Frankford (1994), and Young (1989), is a way to 
move from Habermas's "universal pragmatics" to 
an "empirical pragmatics," the latter referring to 
the study of actual utterances that occur in spe-
cific social contexts. Given this emphasis on 
empiricizing actual speech in concrete settings, it 
is interesting that Goffman's work in this area 
(e.g., 1971, 1974, 1981, 1983a) has been largely 
ignored. Finally, in offering suggestions for pos-
sible resources for pursuing such a critical in-
quiry, Robinson (1994) points to Argyris's 
(1993a, 1993b; Argyris and Schon 1974) action 
research: "The work of Argyris offers a norma-
tive theory which is compatible with the value 
base of critical theory and which incorporates a 
methodology by which it can be applied to dia-
logical sequences" (p. 72). 
1992b) goes a long way toward answering 
this question.21 Tseelon (l992a) argues that 
the tradition known as impression manage-
ment (1M) (see Arkin 1980; Schlenker 1980; 
Tedeschi 1981; Tedeschi and Melburg 
1984), although rooted in Goffman's (1959) 
seminal work on the presentation of self, 
has veered away from Goffman's original 
intent in a number of crucial ways. Most im-
portant, whereas Goffman's idea of 
"frontstage" and "backstage" attempted 
merely to illustrate how selves can be parti-
tioned in terms of self-presentations before 
a variety of audiences, 1M's interpretation 
of this partitioning is that individuals pos-
sess distinctively "true" private selves and 
distinctively "false" public selves.22 Goff-
man's actor puts on a variety of faces in 
various settings and before particular audi-
ences in an effort to comport him- or herself 
to the exigencies of the social gathering and 
to uphold the definition of the situation. 
1M's social actor, on the other hand, has a 
hidden agenda as he or she goes about the 
business of presenting the self; there is al-
ways a concerted effort to keep a private re-
ality from surfacing during any particular 
public presentation. 
Tseelon (1992a) explains the disjunction 
between the Goffman tradition and 1M as fol-
lows: 
The Goffmanesque approach views people's 
presentational behaviour as a process of nego-
tiation. It is a game of representation. In con-
trast, the position advanced by 1M researchers 
views presentational behaviour as manipula-
tive. According to this view people present 
various images of themselves as a strategic 
21 Welsh (1984) argues that the presented self 
is a product of a capitalist society which places a 
premium on appearances. That is, because bu-
reaucratic actors are constantly monitored and as-
sessed with regard to their job performance and 
effectiveness, this fetish of appearance has given 
rise to an overweening emphasis on impression 
management on the part of these actors (also see 
Willmott 1993). This view of the actor is closer 
to impression managements's, and even Haber-
mas's, more cynical view of the actor as a savvy 
manipulator concerned merely with working the 
system for the enhancement of self. 
22 For useful discussions of the divergence of 
Goffman and 1M within the context of organiza-
tional behavior, see Giacalone and Beard (1994) 
and Rosenfeld, Giacalone, and Riordan (1994). 
move. Unlike Goffman's approach, this 'game' 
is not an end in itself but a means to an end of 
gaining benefits. It is a game of misrepresenta-
tion. (P. 116) 
It is my contention that Habermas, as well 
as many researchers working on therapeutic 
approaches to improving communication and 
interaction practices in professions or orga-
nizations, tend to make the mistake of lump-
ing together Goffman's work and that of 1M. 
What Habermas and many other astute social 
thinkers have failed to understand clearly is 
that, although all deceptive presentations are 
staged, not all staged presentations are de-
ceptive or geared toward obfuscation or dis-
tortion. 
The theory of communicative action, then, 
must address two difficult and interrelated 
issues-one ontological, one epistemologi-
cal-if it is to advance any further. With re-
spect to ontology, the theory must specify 
more concretely the nature of impression 
management, or rather, it must be able to an-
swer the question, to what extent is the pre-
sented self a naturally occurring aspect of 
human interaction? With respect to episte-
mology, the theory must be able to address 
the question, how are we to know the aims 
or intent of the presented self? And knowing 
this, how then can we reconcile the realities 
of impression management with the potential 
for communicative action contained in the 
analytic of the presented self? 
These and others issues point the way to-
ward a continuing refinement of the theory 
of communicative action and reaffirm the 
important role that Goffman's dramaturgical 
theory of action can play in achieving this 
end. Most significantly, the achievement of 
such an empirically-grounded theory of com-
municative action holds the potential for ush-
ering in a new era in applied sociology, es-
pecially with respect to the study and expli-
cation of organizational behavior and com-
munication. 
In fact, I envision a refinement of the 
Habermas-Goffman communicative action 
schema which could eventually serve as the 
basis for a clinical sociology practice. This 
professional practice would involve helping 
people, groups, or organizations that are hav-
ing difficulty-communicative or other-
wise-in their daily relationships. This 
would not be a counseling service per se, as 
would be typical of social work or psycho-
therapeutic practice (see Kubacki 1994), but 
would involve applying the skills of 
Verstehen to everyday situations, stressing 
the social or cultural factors, rather than the 
individual, psychological, or symptomo-
logical factors, implicated in such distur-
bances. I hope to develop and present this 
applied schema in a future work. 
James J. Chriss recently completed his Ph.D. in 
sociology at the University of Pennsylvania. His 
main areas of interest. are sociological theory. 
criminology. and organizational behavior. His 
current projects include a study of how males and 
females differ in their attitudes toward participa-
tion in popular dance. the sociology of consult-
ing in organizations. embezzlement as an ongo-
ing practical accomplishment. and getting Erving 
Gofftnan's dissertation published. 
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